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Argumentation competence is an essential skill to be acquired in university education.
However, there is a lack of advanced argumentation competence even for graduate
students. To foster argumentation competence, typical interventions focus on example-
based learning. Another approach is learning from advocatory errors. The combination
of both approaches is presenting examples of erroneous arguments. Drawing on the
concept of case-based learning, we developed a learning intervention that presents
examples of argumentation errors in story-based designs, i.e., the erroneous examples
are embedded in a story featuring the argumentation between two persons in an
authentic setting. In this contribution, we report the results of two studies. In a first study,
we compared an experimental condition receiving a story-based learning intervention
with a control condition without a learning intervention. We found that learning from
advocatory errors in a story-based design fosters students’ argumentation competence.
In a second study, we compared two forms of instructional support (elaboration
vs. testing prompts) against a control condition without instructional support. There
was a significant increase in argumentation competence in both conditions with
instructional support but not in the control condition. The results also support the
cautious conclusion that elaboration prompts seem to be more effective than testing
prompts. Overall, the results from both studies indicate that the story-based design
is apt to foster students’ argumentation competence. We also considered the impact
of prior argumentation competence and found in both studies that the present level
of argumentation competence is a factor determining the argumentation competence
after learning.
Keywords: argumentation, competence, learning from advocatory errors, example-based learning, heuristics
INTRODUCTION
Acquiring scientific argumentation competence is a major goal of higher education study programs
(Dietrich et al., 2015). In general, argumentation refers to the use of arguments for the sake of
supporting a certain claim with a reason to persuade others of the claim’s validity (Lumer, 2007).
In this way, Van Eemeren et al. (1996, p. 5) define argumentation as “a verbal and social activity
of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for
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the listener or reader by putting forward a constellation of
propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before
a rational judge.” An argument itself is a proposition consisting
of a claim that is supported by a reason (Toulmin, 1958; Booth
et al., 2008). In scientific contexts, we consider argumentation as
the use of scientific evidence to support a claim to convince others
of the claim’s validity. From a normative perspective, the main
source of scientific evidence is the body of scientific knowledge
that is (more or less) ratified by the scientific community
and consists of either scientific theories, models, concepts, or
empirical findings that result from the application of scientific
methods. Usually, supporting evidence has to be integrated
into a complex network of related scientific knowledge and
has sometimes to be successfully de-contextualized (cf., Stark
et al., 2009, p. 52). Besides, arguments are in part domain-
specific (cf., Fischer et al., 2014). This notion dates back to
the work of Toulmin (1958), who noted that some aspects
of arguments may vary from discipline to discipline (Toulmin
used the term field), whereas other aspects of arguments do
not depend on the discipline. This is because some aspects of
an argument may depend on contextually shared assumptions.
Such assumptions are given, e.g., by a scientific community
whose members put forward norms to which arguments must
adhere. These argumentation norms, either stipulated by the
scientific community or by substantial or logical requirements,
suggest how scientific evidence is correctly used to support a
claim. Besides such normative issues, arguments appear in two
general types. Britt and Larson (2003) distinguish between claim-
first and reason-first arguments which are hereafter referred
to as Type 1 and Type 2 arguments (cf., Von der Mühlen
et al., 2019). In Type 1 arguments the claim is mentioned
first and followed by the supporting evidence. For example, in
the argument “Extrovert people are more likely to have social
contacts, because studies have found a statistically significant
higher amount of social contacts with strangers for extrovert
than for introvert people.” the claim about the social contacts
is presented before the supporting evidence is mentioned. In
contrast, in Type 2 arguments the supporting evidence is
presented before the claim. For example, the former example
in Type 2 form is “Studies found that extrovert people show
a statistically higher amount of social contacts with strangers
than introvert people, thus extroverts are more likely to have
social contacts with strangers.” In the context of a competency-
based approach, the use of scientific evidence to support claims
can be described as a domain-specific disposition (cf., Klieme
and Leutner, 2006; Dietrich et al., 2015) that is acquired within
a study program. Thus, the correct use of argumentation is
a competence which is hereafter referred to as argumentation
competence. However, argumentation competence is mostly not
explicitly taught resulting in students – and even graduates and
experts – showing deficient arguments (cf., Astleitner et al., 2003).
In traditional university education, especially in sciences like
psychology and other social sciences, the traditional academic
courses are not tailored to foster argumentation competence, and
it cannot be expected that argumentation competence arises as a
kind of epiphenomenon (Stark et al., 2009). As summarized in
Fischer et al. (2014), students show deficits in the use of scientific
evidence, make claims without any justification, or do not use
scientific concepts to support their claims (Sadler, 2004). Other
deficits refer to the quality of the arguments (Kelly and Takao,
2002) or the acknowledgment of different perspectives on the
same topic (Sadler, 2004).
From a normative perspective, by defining an error as a
deviation from a given norm (Mehl, 1994), the deficient use of
arguments constitutes an error. In the case of argumentation,
the error consists in violating the argumentation norms that
govern the correct use of scientific evidence resulting in
erroneous arguments. Stark (2005) classified students’ erroneous
arguments into three different types. The first error type
describes the erroneous reference to non-scientific everyday
bodies of knowledge like, e.g., everyday observations and private
experiences, beliefs, or implicit theories. An example of an
erroneous argument of this type would be the justification
of a claim about exam nerves with the report of their own
classroom experience. The second error type describes the
inappropriate choice of scientific theories, models, or concepts
in the justification of a claim. An example of this error type
would be the justification of claims about long-lasting knowledge
restructuring processes with the theory of mental models, which
are better explained with schema theory. In this example,
an inappropriate theory is used for justification. Although
both theories relate to memory processes, mental models are
thought to cover short-term memory processes, e.g., in sentence
comprehension, but not long-lasting knowledge restructuring
processes for which schema theory is more appropriate. Besides
using an inappropriate theory, erroneous arguments can also
encompass essentially appropriate theories in combination with
theories or models that fit better to the current claim. An
example would be the use of Heider’s (1958) distinction between
internal and external attribution processes to support an assertion
about an attribution process whereas Kelley’s (1973) covariation
principles would provide better support because this theory is
more fine-grained. The third error type describes the erroneous
reference to empirical findings. Examples for this may be the
misinterpretation of correlational findings in terms of causality.
The findings regarding students’ deficits in argumentation
competence suggest that interventions targeting the various
argumentation errors are indicated. There is a vast literature
focusing on intervention strategies relating to various
instructional approaches and study types like, e.g., experiments
and field studies, see Fischer et al. (2014) for an overview of recent
studies. Two examples of recent studies are the contributions of
Hefter et al. (2014) and Von der Mühlen et al. (2019). Drawing
on the instructional method of example-based learning and the
self-explanation principle (cf., Renkl, 2014), Hefter et al. (2014)
developed a short-term intervention that fostered students’
argumentation skills. Von der Mühlen et al. (2019) developed
an intervention based on the concept of constructivist learning
environments (Jonassen, 1999). An instructional approach that
focuses directly on possible errors is Oser’s (2007) learning
from errors-approach. A special form of Oser’s (2007) approach
is learning from advocatory errors in which learners are not
required to make errors themselves. Instead, learning may occur
by observing others making errors and receiving the correct
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solution. Wagner et al. (2014) demonstrated that learning from
advocatory errors fosters preservice teacher’s argumentation
competence. For instance, their findings suggest that, given
appropriate instructional support, learning from advocatory
errors enables teacher students to argue about problems like exam
nerves drawing on scientific theories or models. Thus, learning
from advocatory errors seems to be a promising approach to
foster argumentation competence (cf., Klein et al., 2017).
Theoretical Background
In the following sections, we provide the theoretical foundations
of learning from advocatory errors, i.e., the notion of negative
knowledge, avoidance strategies, as well as the necessary
prerequisites. After that, we elaborate on the use of learning
from advocatory errors in fostering argumentation competence.
Drawing on this, we develop the foundations for the kind
of learning intervention we are going to propose in this
contribution, i.e., a story-based design consisting in a
combination of principles of example-based learning and
anchored instruction. Regarding the learning intervention,
we finally comment on a defining feature of the proposed
intervention, i.e., the presentation of avoidance strategies as
heuristics. To conclude the introduction section, we elaborate
on two important issues that must be taken into account when
studying the effects of learning interventions. The first issue
refers to the form of instructional support that is necessary for
successful learning from advocatory errors. The second refers
to the role of prior knowledge for learning and evaluating the
outcome of learning interventions.
Learning From Advocatory Errors
Learning from advocatory errors is, as already mentioned, a
special form of learning from errors that draws on the same basic
learning process and preconditions. In the following, we firstly
present the processes and conditions as well as the outcomes
of learning from errors and elaborate on the peculiarities of
advocatory learning from errors.
In learning from errors, learners’ performance of a task yield
outcomes that do not fulfill a given norm (Mehl, 1994). The
violation of a norm constitutes an error. Under the conditions
that the learner becomes aware of and understands the error,
and has the motivation to correct the error, learning progress
is possible (Oser, 2007). The actual learning consists in the
comparison of the error with the correct solution (cf., Wagner
et al., 2014). As a result, the error is not discarded from
memory, instead it is stored together with the correct solution.
Thus, learning from errors results in the acquisition of negative
knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what is wrong and what is to
be avoided during task performance (Gartmeier et al., 2008).
Avoidance strategies, i.e., strategies to avoid the error in the
future, are an integral part of negative knowledge. The acquisition
of negative knowledge and especially the acquisition of avoidance
strategies should decrease the probability of committing the
error in the future.
In learning form advocatory errors, learners acquire negative
knowledge when observing the errors of others (Oser, 2007).
This concept is similar to Bandura’s (1977) social-cognitive
learning theory and draws on the notion that learning can
occur by observing the social environment. More importantly,
in Oser’s (2007) concept, the social environment refers not only
to actual persons but is extended to include fictive actions,
e.g., stories, novels, movies, etc. Stated otherwise, learning from
advocatory errors can occur in an extended social environment.
A necessary condition to enable learning from advocatory errors
is the identification of the learners with the person making the
error. This requirement is analogous to the requirement of an
identification of the learners with the model in social-cognitive
learning theory (Bandura, 1977). The context in which the error
occurs should also be relevant for the learners (Oser, 2007).
In the context of argumentation competence, learning from
advocatory errors consists in observing erroneous arguments
and their correction. Learning from advocatory errors has the
advantage that it does not require the learners to commit a
specific error. From an instructional point of view, this concept
allows presenting specific errors to learners for which negative
knowledge and avoidance strategies should be acquired.
Fostering Argumentation Competence Through
Learning From Advocatory Errors
Presenting specific errors instantiates a form of instructional
means to trigger learning processes and may be considered
as a form of learning from examples (Kopp et al., 2008).
Such erroneous examples may especially be suited to foster
conceptual understanding in the learning domain (Booth et al.,
2013). Erroneous examples also represent a special form of case-
based learning (e.g., Williams, 1992). Jonassen and Hernandez-
Serrano (2002) state that cases, in the sense of instances of a
paradigmatic example, are used in analogical reasoning when
problems of the same type are present (cf., Kolodner, 1997).
Such cases in turn can be presented in the form of stories. In
combination with the notion of the extended social environment,
these stories can be fictive. Therefore, we will hereafter use the
terms story-based design to denote a fictive story containing an
erroneous argumentation.
Regarding the content of the examples, Stark’s (2005)
classification of argumentation errors provides a systematic
presentation of common erroneous arguments. Additionally, as
an argument is always related to specific content, such examples
are cases of so-called double-content examples (Schworm and
Renkl, 2007) consisting of two domains, i.e., the learning-
domain and the exemplifying-domain. In this contribution, the
learning-domain represents knowledge about argumentation
errors whereas the exemplifying-domain represents knowledge
about the content that is used to demonstrate the errors. Double-
content examples have been successfully used in research on
fostering argumentation competence (e.g., Schworm and Renkl,
2007; Hefter et al., 2014; Klopp and Stark, 2018).
To foster argumentation competence, a possible story-based
design consists of a dialogue in which two persons are
involved in argumentative discourse. To ease the identification
of the learners with the protagonists shown in the story,
learners and protagonists should be similar with respect to
some relevant characteristics (cf., Bandura, 1977). For instance,
when psychology students’ argumentation competence is to be
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fostered, the protagonists should also be psychology students.
Additionally, drawing on principles of anchored instruction
(Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1992), the
story should be placed in an authentic setting to enhance
the learner’s motivation. In this dialogue, the first protagonist
uses an erroneous argument that, in turn, is corrected by the
second protagonist. By correcting the erroneous argument, the
learners (the reader of the dialogue) gain negative knowledge
and avoidance strategies. This story of two psychology students
could be narrated in the frame of a university lesson ensuring the
relevance condition and the authenticity of the dialogue. Such a
story-based design has been shown to foster the argumentation
skills of students in the domain of education (Stark et al., 2009).
Although the story-based design in this study did not directly
feature advocatory errors, the learning intervention contained a
special “elaboration tool.” Within this tool, argumentation errors
according to Stark’s (2005) classification were modeled and it was
demonstrated how scientific theories, models, and concepts as
well as empirical evidence is applied to support the claim. The
elaboration was also implemented in a story-based design.
However, as it is well-known in example-based learning
(e.g., Renkl, 2014), providing examples does not ensure positive
learning outcomes. As the story-based design is an instantiation
of an example and thus simply providing an authentic and
relevant story does not ensure successful learning. The drawback
of example-based learning is triggering a shallow instead of a
deep elaboration (Chi et al., 1989; Renkl, 2014). Examples are also
conducive to illusions of understanding. To counter these effects,
instructional support, e.g., in forms of prompts, is necessary.
Avoidance Strategies and Heuristics
As a part of negative knowledge, avoidance strategies are
an important result of learning from advocatory errors.
From an instructional point of view, the presentation of
avoidance strategies is vital. A possible format to present
avoidance strategies is heuristics. Heuristics are experience-based
principles that help to solve analogous problems by ignoring
unimportant information and focusing on relevant information
(cf., Gigerenzer and Zimmer, 2014). Heuristics are cognitive
devices that allow fast and reliable judgment (Gigerenzer and
Brighton, 2009). Thus, avoidance strategies in the form of
heuristics may especially be suited to provide a rule for the learner
to avoid the error in the future. For example, a specific error
from Stark’s (2005) classification is interpreting correlational
findings in terms of causality. An erroneous argument with this
error is the support of a claim about a causal relation with a
correlational result. A possible heuristic to avoid this error would
be: “Note that correlation does not equal causality!” In the context
of argumentative reasoning, Wenglein et al. (2015) have shown
that heuristics are beneficial for the use of correct evidence in
argument construction. However, as the avoidance strategy is
part of the example, it is also prone to shallow elaboration and
illusions of understanding.
Instructional Support
As it is well-known from previous studies (e.g., Kopp et al.,
2008; Wagner et al., 2014), learning interventions drawing on
learning from advocatory errors need instructional support to
be effective. In the research of learning from examples, it is
an established finding that instructional support is necessary to
overcome shallow elaborations and illusions of understanding
(Renkl, 2014). As the main part of the learning process consists
in the elaboration of the contrast between the error and the
correct solution, it is likely that the quality of the learners’
self-explanations of this contrast influences learning outcomes
(Wagner et al., 2014). To foster argumentation competence
prompts should refer to the argumentation principles to be
learned, i.e., in this context the error and the avoidance
strategy (Schworm and Renkl, 2007). Besides the prompts, Kopp
et al. (2008) demonstrated that elaborated feedback explaining
specifics of the error and the correct solution is necessary to
ensure learning success.
The study of Wagner et al. (2014) indicated that the learning
outcome is better when the instructional support refers to
both, the presentation and the reconstruction of avoidance
strategies. In this study, the presentation prompt contained a
short description of the avoidance strategy. The participants were
instructed to reflect on these strategies. Reconstruction prompts
contained an open question to describe the avoidance strategy.
Besides, feedback in the form of a sample solution was given. The
prompts have in common that they firstly rehearse the avoidance
strategy. Secondly, they prompt an elaboration of the avoidance
strategy’s content associated with an elaboration of the contrast
between the error and the correct solution. Wagner et al. (2014)
experimentally varied the presentation of these prompts. In total,
there were five conditions: a first condition with the presentation
of both prompt types, a second and third condition with either
the presentation or reconstruction prompts, respectively, a fourth
condition in which the intervention without any prompts was
given and a fifth control condition. The results indicate that in
the first condition the learning outcome was highest, whereas the
learning outcomes were almost equal in the second and third
conditions, and lowest in the fourth condition. In the control
condition, there was no learning gain at all. These results suggest
that the elaboration triggered by the prompts is necessary for
learning. Additionally, the results suggest that the more support
triggering elaborations on the learning content is available, the
larger the learning gain.
In the case of the Wagner et al. (2014) study, the elaboration
triggered by the prompt requires that the learners retrieve the
acquired negative knowledge and reflect on how to avoid the
error. Another way to elicit retrieving negative knowledge and
avoidance strategies and to initiate elaboration is by means of the
testing effect. The testing effect means learning is improved when
a test is taken on the previously learned content (e.g., Endres and
Renkl, 2015). Thus, when prompts are designed according to the
testing effect, they should ask participants questions regarding the
previously learned content of the learning domain. The testing
effect builds on the elaborative retrieval theory (cf., Carpenter,
2009; Halamish and Bjork, 2011; Rowland, 2014), which features
two main cognitive processes. The first process is the retrieval
induced by working on a testing question that elicits spreading
activation in associative memory that in turn strengthens existing
associations and builds up new associations to close memory
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content. The second process is the degree of semantic elaboration
and the mental effort invested to that end. Especially the second
process explains that a challenging task leads to more mental
effort and consequently to more activation and finally, better
learning outcomes (Endres and Renkl, 2015). Consequently, the
testing task, i.e., in the context of this contribution the prompts,
should require mental effort to be effective, and additionally,
feedback about the correct response should also be given.
Thus, testing on the content in the learning domain is also a
promising way to construct prompts and the question arises what
kind of prompts are more efficient in fostering learning from
advocatory errors.
Besides the question of the effectiveness of different prompts,
there is also the question of the quality of the elaboration of the
prompts. Learners may either work on the prompts superficially
or deeply. In the context of learning with examples, Chi et al.
(1989) showed that successful learners produced higher quality
self-explanations than unsuccessful learners. Stark (1999) and
Renkl (2014) also demonstrated that the quality of the self-
explanation fosters learning success. The question arises if the
quality of the prompt elaboration has any effects on learning
outcomes. As the prompts are tasks, a possible measure of the
quality of task elaboration is if the task is solved correctly or not.
Thus, do learners that perform better on the prompt tasks also
have higher learning gains?
Prior Knowledge
A common finding in educational psychology is the importance
of prior knowledge for learning (cf., Dochy, 1992; Hattie, 2009).
Prior knowledge that is available to a learner before the learning
task is the best predictor for future learning outcomes. It also
determines to which information attention is paid to, which
aspects are regarded as important, and what is understood
(e.g., Alexander, 1996). The importance of prior knowledge
was shown in several studies implementing example-based
learning (c.f., Stark, 1999). Große and Renkl (2007) showed that
prior knowledge is also important for learning with erroneous
examples because it supports effective self-explanation processes
resulting in higher learning outcomes. Prior knowledge also
supports the learners’ understanding of what is wrong in a
given situation and why it is wrong and therefore the potential
of learning from errors can fully unfold (Siegler, 2002). As
stated by Oser and Spychiger (2005), presenting errors only
provides an opportunity for learning when the learner fully
understands the error.
With regard to prior knowledge, the form of double-content
examples implies that a distinction between prior knowledge
concerning the learning domain and the exemplifying domain
must be made. Concerning the learning domain, prior knowledge
about argumentation errors is of primary relevance. The present
level of argumentation competence, as a kind of applied
knowledge, is a possible measure. Results of Von der Mühlen
et al. (2019) suggest that prior argumentation competence affects
learning gains. Concerning the content domain, domain-specific
content knowledge could be relevant. For instance, for errors
concerning the use of statistical results, prior knowledge in
statistics may matter in understanding the argumentation error.
Klopp et al. (2013) presented evidence that domain-specific prior
knowledge is a factor determining the results of learning from
advocatory errors. Taken together, the well-known importance
of prior knowledge and the empirical evidence for its relevance
in learning from errors and in learning argumentation skills
imply the following: Firstly, the present level of argumentation
competence should be controlled for and secondly, prior
knowledge concerning the exemplifying domain should also
be controlled for.
The Present Contribution
The present contribution has three goals. The first goal is a
proof-of-concept, i.e., if a learning intervention in the form of
the above presented story-based design in combination with
instructional support fosters argumentation competence. The
second goal is to examine the effectiveness of different kinds
of instructional support in fostering argumentation competence.
Because of the domain-specificity of argumentation, we refer to
the domain of psychology and the argumentation competence of
psychology students. The third goal is to investigate if the quality
of elaboration of the instructional support measures is related
to learning outcomes. To reach these three research goals, we
conducted two studies.
To reach the first goal, we investigated in a first study
if learning from advocatory errors provided in a story-based
design fosters argumentation competence. In this Study 1, we
compared an experimental condition (learning intervention)
with instructional support in form of elaboration prompts with
a control condition. Study 1 thus serves as a proof-of-concept
of the story-based design and as a first evaluation of the
learning intervention.
To reach the second goal, we investigated in a second study
the effectiveness of two methods of instructional support, i.e.,
we compared learning outcomes of instructional support in
form of elaborations prompts as in the study of Wagner et al.
(2014) with testing prompts. In Study 2, we compared two
experimental conditions that received a learning intervention
with different types of instructional support with a control
condition that received the learning intervention without any
instructional support.
Concerning the third goal, we examined in both studies
the effects of the instructional support on the learning
outcomes, i.e., we investigated the relation of the quality of the
prompt elaboration with the argumentation competence after
the intervention.
Both studies have in common that they consider the same
basic type of learning intervention. In Study 1, the focus is
on a proof-of-concept of the story-based design. Therefore,
the learning intervention in Study 1 is only compared with a
control condition receiving a bogus intervention. Additionally,
the learning intervention contained elaboration prompts whose
effectiveness was evaluated before (see section “Introduction”;
Wagner et al., 2014). In contrast, in Study 2 the focus is
on the evaluation of different types of instructional support,
i.e., elaboration vs. testing prompts. Therefore, in Study 2,
two learning interventions with corresponding prompts were
compared with a version of the learning intervention without
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prompts. Besides these main goals, we also control for possible
effects of prior knowledge, i.e., in the context of these two studies
the level of argumentation competence before the intervention
and domain-specific prior knowledge. In this way, the effects of
prior knowledge are exploratively scrutinized in each study.
STUDY 1
As already mentioned before, the goal of Study 1 is to
investigate if the story-based design is apt to foster argumentation
competence by means of learning from advocatory errors.
Additionally, in the experimental condition, the question if the
quality of prompt elaboration is related with the argumentation
competence after taking the intervention is investigated.
Design and Content of the Learning
Intervention
Drawing on the case-based story design presented above, we
developed an intervention that features fictive, argumentative
discourses in the form of a dialogue between two psychology
students. The intervention was implemented in a computer-
based version using the Sosci software (Leiner, 2019). In
the following, the two psychology students are referenced as
Protagonist 1 and Protagonist 2. Each of these discourses refers
to one error type according to the classification of Stark (2005)
and contains an example for a Type 1 and Type 2 argument.
The discourses are structured as follows: In the first part of the
dialogue, Protagonist 1 makes an erroneous Type 2 argument.
In turn, Protagonist 2 points out that the argument contains an
error and explains why the presented evidence does not support
the claim. Protagonist 2 also presents an avoidance strategy in the
form of a heuristic. Afterward, an elaboration prompt targeting
the explanation of the erroneous argument is presented to the
learner. In the second part of the dialogue, Protagonist 2 provides
an erroneous Type 1 argument. Now, Protagonist 1 points out
that Protagonist 2 made a violation of the heuristic he shortly
provided before. Then Protagonist 1 explains why the argument
of Protagonist 2 violated the heuristic. Afterward, an elaboration
prompt targeting the application of the avoidance strategy is
presented. Figure 1 provides an overview of the structure of
the dialogues. In total, seven of these dialogues were presented.
At the end of the intervention, a summary of all avoidance
strategies was provided.
The content of the intervention targeted the error types
presented by Stark (2005). According to the number of dialogues,
seven specific errors were considered. Table 1 provides an
overview of the errors, their respective type and contains a
description of each error. To avoid effects of prior knowledge in
the exemplifying domain, the content presented in the dialogues
was fictive, i.e., we did not use real psychological work to
construct the erroneous and correct arguments. However, all
examples draw on general psychological knowledge and when
empirical findings were presented, we used simulated data.
Elaboration prompts were given in the form of multiple-
choice-tasks. Each prompt had three response alternatives of
which one was the correct solution. To induce deep elaboration,
the answer options were carefully designed so that all alternatives
were plausible and the participants had to reflect the different
options to find the correct one. The prompts were provided
after the first and second parts of the dialogue. The first prompt
asked how the error and the avoidance strategy are related (and
therefore also relates indirectly to the contrast of the error and
the correct solution), whereas the second prompt referred to
the application of the avoidance strategy. The participants had
to answer the elaboration prompts, otherwise they could not
continue in the learning intervention. Drawing on Kopp et al.
(2008), we provided feedback for each prompt. The participants
received the correct answer and a short explanation of the
answer and were instructed to compare their response with the
correct response. In the control condition, a bogus intervention
was used containing a text about the history of psychology.
Integrated into the text were fake-prompts, i.e., prompts that
asked the participants a question regarding the content they read.
Feedback of the correct response to each prompt was supplied.
The text in the bogus intervention did not refer to issues about
argumentation and was approximately as long as the text of the
learning intervention.
Hypotheses
We hypothesize that (H1) learning from advocatory errors fosters
argumentation competence. Because of the relevance of prior
knowledge, we hypothesize that argumentation competence in
the pretest has an impact on the argumentation competence in
the posttest (H2), i.e., we will consider pretest argumentation
competence to account for its effects. Additionally, as many of
the argumentation errors in the intervention referred to statistical
methods, we expect that prior knowledge in statistics will have
an impact on argumentation competence in the pretest and the
posttest, respectively (H3). Thus, prior knowledge in statistics will
again be included in the model to account for its effects. Although
not directly related to the research question put forward above,
the hypotheses H2 and H3 are a kind of auxiliary hypotheses
that serve to control for the effects of prior knowledge. From an
explorative perspective, H2 and H3 enable us to scrutinize the
effects of prior knowledge. Regarding the possible effects of the
quality of prompt elaboration, we hypothesize that the quality of
the prompt elaborations is positively related to the argumentation
competence after the intervention (H4).
Materials and Methods
Sample, Experimental Design, and Procedure
In total, N = 45 psychology students from a Southwestern
German university participated in Study 1 (34 females). The
mean age was 22.82 years (SD = 2.77). On average, the
participants were in the fourth semester (MSemester = 4.33,
SD = 2.92). The subjects were recruited through social networks
and billboard postings. They received a 2 h time credit
for the required participation in psychological experiments.
The participants were randomly allocated to an experimental
condition (EC; NEC = 25) and a control condition (CC;
NCC = 20). The slightly different participant numbers in the
EC and CC resulted from participants that agreed to take part
and were allocated to a condition but did not show up. The
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FIGURE 1 | Dialogue structure for a specific error.
experiment took place in group sessions with 10 participants at
maximum. However, the participants worked on their own with
the learning material.
Participants in the experimental condition received the
learning intervention whereas the participants in the control
condition received the bogus training intervention. The
interventions were provided in the form of a computer program.
The program’s design required the participants to fill in all
required tasks, otherwise, they could not continue. So, no
missing values are in the data set. A session was scheduled for 2
h, including pre- and posttest and the intervention. To ensure
ecological validity, the time was not restricted. However, no
participant exceeded the scheduled 2 h (Mtime = 79.39 min,
SDtime = 20.07, Maxtime = 106.22).
The procedure was as follows: First, the participants answered
some demographic questions and then took a test assessing
prior knowledge in statistics. Afterward, the participants worked
through the argumentation competence pretest. Next, in the
EC the learning intervention, and in the CC the bogus
TABLE 1 | Argumentation errors covered in the learning intervention in Study 1.
Dialogue Error description
1 Correlation does not imply causality
2 False generalizability of results
3 False generalization of between-group-comparison
4 Neglect of multiple perspectives
5 Neglecting the context
6 Misinterpreting significant results
– Disregard of effect size
– Disregard of sample size
7 Disregard of explained variance
intervention was presented. Finally, the participants took the
argumentation competence posttest and answered four items
measuring subjective learning success. The participants worked
self-paced through all parts of the study. A student research
assistant was present to answer participants’ general questions
about the procedure but they did not answer any questions
regarding the content of the intervention. Figure 2 gives a
depiction of the procedure (in both studies).
Argumentation Competence Test (ACT)
Argumentation competence in the pre- and posttest (ACT1
and ACT2) was assessed by means of a multiple-choice-test.
The argumentation competence test covered type 1 and type 2
arguments. Each item had three answer options with one option
being the correct argument and an “I don’t know” option. The
sequence of the answer options was randomized, only the “I
don’t know” option was always the last option. The sequence of
the items was the same for all participants. Because type 1 and
type 2 arguments differ and require a different instruction, the
test was split with regard to the argument types. The items were
designed to cover the topics and errors presented in the learning
intervention. The answer options were designed in such a way
that the two incorrect options reflected possible errors. The pre-
and posttest did not contain the same items but were parallelized
with regard to the item content. As in the intervention, the items
in the ACT did not draw on real psychological examples but
used constructed, fictive examples based on general psychological
knowledge. Empirical findings in the items were constructed
using simulated data.
The pre- and posttest contained 19 items in total (the
Supplementary Material contains an example item. In each test,
15 items referred to type 1 arguments and four items to type
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FIGURE 2 | Procedures in Study 1 (top panel) and Study 1 (bottom panel).
2 arguments. Both subscales were added to a total score as
a measure of overall argumentation competence. Each correct
answered item was scored with a 1, so that the sum reflects the
number of correctly answered items. The “I don’t know” option
was counted as an incorrect answer. The maximum number
of points is 19. Criterion-referenced reliability of the test was
calculated with the method provided in Subkoviak (1976) that
yields a coefficient of agreement cr that ranges from 0 to 1. The
criterion-referenced reliability of the pretest was crACT1 = 0.75
and of the posttest crACT2 = 0.85.
Prior Knowledge in Statistics (PKS)
Because some errors in the learning domain referred to the
use of statistical procedures (see Table 1), we assessed prior
knowledge in statistics by means of a multiple-choice-test. The
test consisted of 21 items covering basic statistical subjects such
as samples, correlation and causality, effect size, significance, and
the association of sample size and significance. Each item had
three answer options with one option being the correct answer
and an “I don’t know” option. The sequence of the answer options
was randomized, only the “I don’t know” option was always
the last option. The sequence of the items was the same for all
participants. Each correct answered item was scored with a 1, an
incorrect answer with a 0, so that the sum reflects the number of
correctly answered items. The “I don’t know” option was counted
as an incorrect answer. The criterion-referenced reliability for
the prior knowledge in statistics test was crPKS = 0.73 (the
Supplementary Material contains an example item).
Quality of Prompt Elaboration (QPE)
To measure the prompt elaboration, the answer to the multiple-
choice prompts during the intervention was recorded. A correct
answer was coded as 1 point and a false answer was coded
as 0 points. To get an overall measure of prompt elaboration,
we calculated the sum score. As only the EC received the
intervention, this score was only calculated for participants in the
EC. A correct answer to the prompt was scored as 1, an incorrect
answer was scored as 0. Afterward, the sum score was calculated.
Because there are two prompts in each of the seven dialogues, the
maximum number of points is 14.
Subjective Learning Success (SLS)
Perceived learning success was measured by means of four
self-constructed items in combination with a six-point rating
scale (the items are provided in Supplementary Material). The
theoretical range of the SLS scale is 4–24. Internal consistency
in terms of Cronbach’s α was.93. Subjective learning success is
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used as a manipulation check, so there should be a significant
difference between EC and CC.
Statistical Analysis and Sample Size Planning
The data were analyzed by means of linear models. Additionally,
we used t-tests. To check the internal validity of the results, we
used a linear model with ACT1 as the dependent variable and
EC and PKS as explanatory variables (LM1). Additionally, we
compared SLS between the experimental conditions as a kind of
manipulation check with a t-test. With regard to the intervention,
we set up a linear model with ACT2 as the dependent variable
and with EC, PKS, and ACT1 as explanatory variables (LM2).
In these models, the experimental condition was entered as a
dummy-coded variable with the reference group being the CC.
To test if there is a change in ACT in each condition, we set
up a third linear model (LM3), in which the difference between
ACT2 and ACT1 in regressed on the EC and PKS. For LM3,
we compute the estimated marginal means (EMM; Searle et al.,
1980). The EMM represent the mean difference predicted by
LM3. By means of a Wald test, we test if the EMM differ from
zero, i.e., we test if the mean difference in each condition is
different from zero. The p-values for this test are adjusted to avoid
α-error inflation. In the last linear model, LM4, we regress ACT2
on QPE while controlling for ACT1 and PKS, i.e., QPE, ACT1,
and PKS are the explanatory variables in the model. Because
only the participants in EC2 received the intervention with the
prompts, LM4 is only calculated for this subsample. Regarding
possible interactions, we checked for all possible interaction
terms between the explanatory variables. If an interaction proved
significant, the interaction term and all lower-order terms were
included in the model, non-significant interaction terms were
discarded (cf., Fox, 2016).
The various linear models relate to the research hypothesis.
LM2 is to scrutinize the hypothesis about the learning
intervention H2, whereas LM4 is to scrutinize the hypothesis
H4 about the effects of the prompt elaboration. Regarding the
auxiliary hypotheses H2 and H3, hypothesis H3 is incorporated
in each linear model. Hypothesis H3 is not considered in LM3
because in this model the difference between ACT2 and ACT1
is regressed on EC and PKS and consequently, ACT1 cannot be
controlled for by entering as a covariate. Figure 3 provides an
overview of the analysis step and the various linear models and
other statistical used in each step. Additionally, Figure 3 provides
an overview of the statistical analysis and also shows to which
hypothesis each analysis step relates.
As a measure of the effect size of each explanatory variable, we
used η2 (cf., Richardson, 2011). We consider η2-values of 0.01,
0.06, and 0.14 as small, medium, and large effects, respectively.
Additionally, for the change in argumentation competence
between the pre-and posttest, we use Cohen’s d as a measure
of effect size, with 0.20 being a small, 0.50 being a medium,
and 0.80 being a large effect (cf., Cohen, 1988). Moreover, we
use a Monte Carlo simulation to investigate if the reduction
in argumentation competence in the control condition (see the
“Results” section) affected the conclusion about the effectiveness
of the learning intervention.
All analyses were realized with R (R Core Team, 2019,
version 3.6.1) in combination with the packages car (Fox and
Weisberg, 2019; version 3.0.3), lsr (Navarro, 2015; version
0.5), psych (Revelle, 2018, Version 1.8.12), and MASS
(Venables and Ripley, 2002; version 7.3-51.4). A self-written
R-script was used to calculate the criterion-referenced reliability
according to Subkoviak (1976).
Regarding the sample size, we used G-Power software (Faul
et al., 2007). To get an approximate estimate of the required
sample size, we assumed a large effect size in combination with
a linear model with one categorical explanatory variable with two
groups and two metric explanatory variables. We also assumed an
α = 0.05 significance level and a power of 0.80. In such a setting, a
sample size ofN = 51 participants would be necessary. To account
for a possible dropout, we considered a total sample size of N = 54
to be uniformly allocated to each condition. Although our actual
sample size is below this level, the difference between the actual
and necessary sample size is rather small and should thus be
without consequences.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2.
Table 3 contains the results of LM1 and LM2, and Table 6
presents the results of LM4. Checking the possible interaction
terms in each model revealed that they are all non-significant,
so we omitted the interaction terms. Concerning the internal
validity, LM1 indicated the expected significant effect of PKS
on ACT1, there was no effect of the experimental condition on
ACT1. However, looking at the descriptive statistics reveals that
in the control condition pretest argumentation competence was
somewhat higher than in the experimental condition.
Regarding the SLS manipulation check, a t-test (with
correction for unequal variances) indicated a significant and
large difference between the experimental and control condition,
t(31.86) = 5.54, p < 0.001, d = 1.71, indicating that the
intervention triggered learning in the EC.
Concerning the effects of the learning intervention, LM2
indicated a large, significant effect of the experimental condition
and a significant effect of the argumentation competence in the
pretest. In contrast to LM1, in LM2 there was no significant effect
of PKS. The EMM for LM3 are given in Table 4. The EMM
shows that there is a significant and medium increase in ACT,
in the EC, but also an almost significant, and small, decrease
of ACT in the CC.
The nearly significant decline in ACT in the CC weakens the
results regarding the effectiveness of the learning intervention.
To scrutinize the result of the effectiveness of the learning
intervention, we consider a scenario in which there is no decrease
in ACT in the CC. In this scenario, we assume for the CC
a population in which the population means and variances of
ACT1 and ACT 2 are equalACT1. In this hypothetical population,
there is no decrease in ACT. Additionally, to account for the
effects of ACT1 and PKS on ACT2, we assume that the population
covariance of ACT1, ACT2, and PKS are equal to the sample
covariances in the CC. By means of a Monte Carlo simulation,
we simulated 1000 data sets with the before described population
setting in the CC. To these simulated data, we added the actual
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FIGURE 3 | Analysis steps in each study. The figure shows the statistical models and corresponding hypotheses in each analysis step. The linear models are
provided in a simplified form, the left-hand side indicates the dependent variables and the right-hand side the regressors, variable names are the same as in
“Materials and Methods” section in both studies respectively. Note that in this figure the experimental condition (EC) in Study 2 is considered in a generic form as a
single variable and not as a dummy-coded variable with two manifestations. Further abbreviations: EMMs: estimated marginal means, GLH: general linear
hypothesis.
data from the EC. For these 1000 datasets, we calculated the LM2.
To judge the robustness of the results concerning the effectiveness
of the intervention, we scrutinize the power of the dummy
regression coefficient indicating the effect of the EC on ACT2.
We define the power as the portion of p-values of the dummy
regression coefficient for which p ≤ 0.05. The results of this
Monte Carlo simulation are presented in Table 5. The mean of
the dummy regression coefficient, which represents the average
effect, is considerably smaller than the regression coefficient in
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of Study 1.










ACT2 10.20 2.78 −1.45 3.09
SLS 9.75 4.99
The means refer to the sum score; Mdiff and SDdiff indicate the mean and standard
deviations of the difference between ACT2 and ACT1.
LM2. But the power indicates that in 98.4% of the simulated
cases, there is a difference between the EC and the CC. Thus,
the simulation of the hypothetical scenario in which there is no
TABLE 3 | Regression results for LM1 and LM2, Study 1.
B SE t p η2
LM1
Const. 6.59 1.57 4.20 <0.001 –
EC 0.06 0.77 0.07 0.943 0.01
PKS 0.38 0.13 2.88 0.006 0.16
F (2, 42) = 4.71, p = 0.014, R2 = 0.18
LM2
Const. 7.53 2.30 3.27 0.002 –
EC 3.14 0.85 3.71 <0.001 0.22
PKS −0.19 0.16 −1.20 0.239 0.02
ACT1 0.44 0.17 2.61 0.012 0.10
F (3, 41) = 7.44, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.35
TABLE 4 | Estimated marginal means for LM3 [F (3, 81) = 3.47, p = 0.020,
R2 = 0.11], Study 1.
Condition Estimate SE z p d
EC 2.14 0.60 3.52 <0.001 0.31
CC −1.03 0.69 −1.03 0.066 –
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decrease in ACT in the CC also supports the hypothesis of the
effectiveness of the learning intervention. Additionally, the mean
of the effect size ηp2 was 0.12 (SD = 0.03) indicating an almost
large effect on average.
Concerning LM4, the results in Table 6 show that there is a
positive and large effect of the QPE on ACT in the EC.
Discussion
Regarding H1, the results indicate that learning from advocatory
errors fosters argumentation competence. In the posttest,
the linear model indicated a clear effect of the experimental
condition. This conclusion is further supported by the
indication of internal validity, the positive results regarding
the manipulation check, and the simulation of the hypothetical
scenario without a decrease of argumentation competence in
the control condition. However, the decrease of argumentation
competence in the control condition remains a small drawback
of the results. As this difference in the pretest is statistically non-
significant, the higher level of pretest argumentation competence
in the control condition may simply reflect a kind of a naturally
occurring fluctuation due to sampling errors. Especially since the
total sample size is rather small, statistics like the mean may not
be quite stable. Additionally, there may have been demotivating
effects of the bogus intervention in the control condition.
Psychology students in Germany have to pass 30 h of compulsory
participation in psychological experiments. Thus, having low
subjective learning success, may decrease the participants’
motivation yielding them to arbitrarily answering the posttest
argumentation test just to acquire the required participation
credit. However, the variance explained by the experimental
condition is rather large. Assuming that a certain portion of this
explained variance is due to demotivating effects of the control
condition would probably not yield a significant decrease. This
view is also supported by the results of the simulation. Taken
together, the hypothesis that learning from advocatory errors in
the form of case-based stories fosters argumentation competence
is supported. But besides this support for H1, a remarkable
finding is the rather low increase in argumentation competence
in the experimental condition.
The results also lent support to the hypothesis H2. The
linear model for the posttest indicates an effect of the pretest
argumentation competence on the posttest argumentation
competence. Thus, this hypothesis is supported and indicates
the well-known Matthew effect of prior knowledge that was also
expected from the results of Von der Mühlen et al. (2019).
With regard to H3, there is a significant effect of prior
knowledge in statistics at the pretest, whereas there is no
significant effect of prior knowledge in statistics in the posttest.
TABLE 5 | Results of the Monte Carlo simulation, Study 1, LM2.
M (B) SD (B) Power
Const. 4.75 0.81 0.938
EC 2.11 0.25 0.984
PKS −0.53 0.05 0.00
ACT1 0.65 0.05 1.00
TABLE 6 | Regression results for LM4, Study 1.
B SE t p η2
Const. 4.71 3.40 1.39 0.181 –
QPE 0.80 0.28 2.87 0.009 0.24
ACT1 0.38 0.21 1.80 0.085 0.10
PKS −0.32 0.23 −1.38 0.181 0.06
F (3, 21) = 4.05, p = 0.020, R2 = 0.36
This is a somewhat unexpected finding, indicating that, indeed,
prior knowledge in statistics affects argumentation competence
(at least, as long as statistical knowledge is needed for
constructing the argument). At the same time, the findings
indicate that the repetition of statistics basics levels out effects
of prior knowledge so that prior knowledge in statistics does
not affect the posttest argumentation competence. However, the
findings did not indicate how prior knowledge in statistics is
involved in the learning processes.
With regard to H4, the results show that, as we have expected,
the quality of the prompt elaboration has a large effect on the
argumentation competence after the intervention, and is this in
line with the results found in the literature cited above.
A limitation of Study 1 is certainly the unequal distribution
of Type 1 and 2 arguments in the argumentation competence
test. Although it could be argued that Type 1 arguments are
more natural (cf., Von der Mühlen et al., 2019), the typical
use of arguments in discourses and texts often require type 2
arguments. Thus, to ensure the validity of the argumentation
competence test, an even distribution of both argument types
should be sought.
STUDY 2
The goal of Study 2 is to investigate the effectiveness of learning
from advocatory errors further and to conceptually replicate
the findings from Study 1. We also aim at investigating the
effectiveness of different prompt types, i.e., prompts drawing
on the testing effect versus elaboration prompts. Moreover, the
question if the quality of prompt elaboration has effects on
the argumentation competence after taking the intervention is
considered again, for each type of prompt separately.
Design of the Learning Intervention
For the learning intervention in Study 2, the same kind of
dialogue as in Study 1 was used but the dialogues were adapted.
Firstly, the strict order of Type 2 arguments in the first part
and Type 1 arguments in the second part of the dialogue
was skipped to provide more authentic dialogues. The framing
of the dialogues aimed at an even distribution of Type 1
and 2 arguments. Moreover, the errors “False generalization of
results” and “Neglecting the context” (see Table 1) from the
intervention were conflated because of their similarity. Thus,
six dialogues were finally presented covering the argumentation
errors provided in Table 7. The intervention in Study 1 was
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realized as a printed booklet. Because participants were asked to
write in the booklets; each participant received their copy.
In the first part of the dialogue, an erroneous argument
was used by Protagonist 1. In turn, Protagonist 2 hinted at
the error and provided the contrast between the error and the
correct argument. Finally, Protagonist 2 also provided a heuristic
with the avoidance strategy. In the second part, Protagonist 2
presented an erroneous argument with the same error as in the
first part. This argument was corrected by Protagonist 1 and the
application of the heuristic was explained.
The learning intervention was set up in three versions. In
the first version, the prompts drew on the testing effect and
consisted of multiple-choice questions asking for the previously
learned content. In total, three prompts were implemented. The
prompts were given after the first part and the second part
of a dialogue, respectively. The first prompt asked a question
regarding the error, whereas the second and third prompt asked
a question for the avoidance strategy. Care was taken that
the questions were general and did not refer to the specific
content of the dialogue but rather to the error or the avoidance
strategy, respectively. Each prompt consisted of a multiple-choice
question. All prompts had three answer options. Only one option
was the correct answer. Feedback of response was provided and
the participants were instructed to compare their response with
the correct one.
In the second version, elaboration prompts were provided
targeting the error featured in the dialogue. In the first part of the
dialogue, the prompts referred to the contrast of the error and
the correct solution. The explanation that was provided in the
first dialogue part described the error and the correct argument
only superficially. The prompt asked to provide a thorough
explanation. In the second part of each dialogue, the explanation
of the avoidance strategy’s application was superficial and a
second prompt again asked to provide a thorough explanation.
Afterward, a third prompt followed asking again a question
regarding the application of the avoidance strategy. All prompts
were designed as a multiple-choice question with one correct
answer option. The first two prompts had three answer options,
whereas the third prompt had three answer options. After each
prompt, feedback of correct response was provided and the
participants were advised to compare the correct solution with
their own. After each prompt (in the first and in the second
version), the printed advice to not turn to the next page before
the task was completed was given; the solution of the prompt was
provided on the next page.
The third version consisted of the text of the first version
but without any prompts. In all versions, an introduction to the
material and task to be done by the participants was provided.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses in Study 2 are largely similar to those in
Study 1. Firstly, we hypothesize that (H1) learning from
advocatory errors fosters argumentation competence. Especially,
we hypothesize that the learning intervention with prompts
fosters argumentation competence. Additionally, we also want to
exploratively investigate if both types of prompts differ in their
effectiveness in fostering argumentation competence. As in Study
1, concerning the importance of prior knowledge, we hypothesize
that the argumentation competence in the pretest has an impact
on the argumentation competence in the posttest (H2). Drawing
on the results of Study 1, we hypothesize that prior knowledge
in statistics will have an impact on pretest argumentation
competence, whereas there is no effect of prior knowledge in
statistics on the posttest argumentation competence (H3). Again,
H2 and H3 are auxiliary hypotheses. As in Study 1, regarding
the possible effects of the quality of prompt elaboration, we
hypothesize that the quality of the prompt elaborations has
a positive effect on the argumentation competence after the
intervention (H4).
Materials and Methods
Sample, Experimental Design, and Procedure
In total, 85 psychology students (N = 15 males) from the same
southwestern Germany university took part and were recruited
in the same way as in Study 1. The mean age was 21.72 years
(SD = 3.24). On average, the participants were in the third
semester (MSemester = 3.08, SD = 1.40). They received a 2
h time credit for the required participation in psychological
experiments. The participants were randomly allocated to a first
experimental condition (EC1; NEC1 = 29), a second experimental
condition (EC2; NEC2 = 29), and a control condition (CC;
NCC = 27). The slightly different participant numbers between
both ECs and the CC resulted from two participants that agreed
to participate and were allocated to the CC but did not show up.
The experiment took place in group sessions with 5 participants
at maximum. The participants worked individually with the
learning material without interacting with each other.
In the first experimental condition (EC1), participants
received the learning intervention with the testing prompts. In
the second experimental condition (EC2), participants received
the learning intervention with elaboration prompts. In the
control condition (CC), participants only received the learning
intervention without instructional support.
The procedure was basically the same as in Study 1. In
total, 120 min were scheduled for all tests and the intervention,
no participant took longer. The participants worked self-paced
through the material. First, the participants received the pretest
booklet which contained some demographic questions, followed
by the prior knowledge in statistics and the argumentation
competence test. After the pretest, the participant requested the
intervention from a student research assistant that guided each
session. Finally, after finishing the intervention, the participant
requested the posttest from the research assistant.
Argumentation Competence Test (ACT)
For assessing the argumentation competence in the pre- and
posttest (ACT1 and ACT2), the same construction as in Study
1 was used but the test was completely revised. Firstly, the
revised test accounted for the conflation of the errors “False
generalization of results” and “Neglecting the context.” Secondly,
the representation of Type 2 arguments was enhanced. The
new test had 22 items in total: 12 items referring to Type 1
and ten items referring to Type 2 arguments. Correct responses
were coded as 1 point and incorrect responses as 0 points; the
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maximum number of points was 22. The pre- and posttest were
different but both tests were parallelized. Criterion-referenced
reliability in the pretest was crpre = 0.88, and in the posttest
crpost = 0.94.
Prior Knowledge in Statistics (PKS)
The prior knowledge in statistics test was essentially the same
as in Study 1, but four items that did not directly relate to
the content of the learning intervention were discarded. Thus,
the final PKS test had 17 items. Correct responses were coded
as 1 point and incorrect responses as 0 points; the maximum
number of points was 17. The criterion-referenced reliability was
crspk = 0.71.
Quality of Prompt Elaboration (QPE)
The same procedure as in Study 1 was applied to get an
overall measure of prompt elaboration. As only the EC1 and
EC2 received the intervention, this score was only calculated
for participants in both conditions. Because there were three
prompts in six dialogues, the maximal number of points was 18.
Statistical Analysis and Sample Size Planning
The same models (LM1-LM3) and tests as in Study 1 were used.
Because there are three experimental conditions in Study 1, there
are now two dummy variables in the linear models. The reference
category was the CC, so the regression coefficients for the dummy
variables indicate the difference between each EC and the CC
while accounting for the other explanatory variables. To test if
the two types of prompts have different effects, we used a general
linear hypothesis (e.g., Fox, 2016, ch. 9) to test the equality of the
two dummy regression coefficients. Regarding LM4, the model in
Study 1 checks in a first step if there is an interaction between
QPE and the experimental condition. As this was the case, we
calculated a model with ACT2 as dependent variables and QPE,
ACT1, and PKS as an explanatory model for the EC1 and EC2
separately. As the participants in the CC did not receive any
prompts, this subsample is not considered in LM4. The same
software as in Study 1 was used. Again, all linear models were
checked for interaction and significant interactions were retained.
Regarding LM4, a significant interaction of QPE and EC would
indicate different effects of QPE in both EC. Therefore, in the
first step we LM4a with the interaction of QPE and EC. As the
analysis revealed a significant interaction, we calculated LM4b. In
LM4b, we regressed ACT2 on ACT1 and PKS in each condition
separately. Again, Figure 3, provides an overview of the statistical
analysis in Study 2.
Regarding the sample size, we draw on the simulation results
of Study 1 and assumed the smallest possible effect size that is
classified as a large effect in combination with a linear model
with one categorical explanatory variable and three groups and
two metric exploratory variables. Additionally, we assumed an
α = 0.05 significant level and a power of.95. In this setting, a
sample size of N = 84 would be necessary. Thus, 29 participants
per experimental condition are necessary. To compensate for
possible dropouts, 32 participants per condition were planned.
As the actual number of students that volunteered is close to the
planned number, the achieved power is as likely as intended.
TABLE 7 | Argumentation errors covered in the learning intervention in Study 2.
Dialogue Error description
1 Correlation does not imply causality
2 False generalization of results
3 False generalization of between-group-comparison
4 Neglect of multiple perspectives
5 Misinterpreting significant results
– Disregard of effect size
– Disregard of sample size
6 Disregard of explained variance
TABLE 8 | Descriptive statistics of Study 2.














ACT2 15.30 3.27 −0.19 2.75
The means refer to the sum score; Mdiff and SDdiff indicate the mean and standard
deviations of the difference between ACT2 and ACT1.
Results
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 8. The regression
results for LM1 and LM2 are shown in Table 9. Table 10
contains the results relating to LM3 and the EMM, and Table 11
contains the results of LM4. Initially, all linear models were
checked for possible interaction terms. In LM2, the interaction
of PKS with ACT1 revealed to be significant, so it was included
in the model. Regarding the internal validity, the regression
results of LM1 shows that there is no effect of the experimental
condition in the pretest. Consequently, the internal validity of
the experimental setting can be assumed. LM1 also indicated a
medium effect of PKS on ACT1.
With regard to the effects of the learning environment,
the regression results for LM2 indicate significant effects of
each experimental condition, with both effects being small. The
regression coefficients indicate a slightly larger effect of EC2,
but the general linear hypothesis for testing the equality of both
dummy regression coefficients indicate that they do not differ,
F(1, 79) = 0.30, p = 0.584. Thus, the effects of experimental
conditions do not differ. LM2 also indicates the effects of ACT1
and PKS on ACT2. The results for the effect of PKS in LM2 are in
contrast to the result from Study 1.
With regard to LM3, Table 10 indicates that the EMM are
different from zero for both EC but not for the CC. The EMM
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TABLE 9 | Regression results for LM1 and LM2, Study 2.
B SE t p η2
LM1
Const. 12.24 1.40 8.77 <0.001 –
EC1 −1.45 0.84 −1.76 0.082 0.03
EC2 −0.20 0.85 −0.24 0.812 0.01
PKS 0.36 0.14 2.57 0.012 0.07
F (3, 81) = 3.13, p = 0.003, R2 = 0.10
LM2
Const. −0.57 4.44 −0.13 0.899 –
EC1 1.44 0.71 2.02 0.047 0.05
EC2 1.82 0.70 2.60 0.011 0.06
PKS 1.32 0.54 2.43 0.017 0.03
ACT1 0.95 0.31 3.05 0.003 0.12
PKS∗ACT1 −0.08 0.04 −2.05 0.044 0.04
F (5, 79) = 6.90, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.30
TABLE 10 | Estimated marginal means for LM3 [F (3, 81) = 3.47, p = 0.020,
R2 = 0.11], Study 2.
Condition Estimate SE z p d
EC1 2.50 0.62 4.07 <0.001 0.27
EC2 1.99 0.62 3.20 0.001 0.21
CC −0.18 0.64 −0.29 0.386 –
in both EC indicate a small effect. Thus, these results support
the hypothesis that instructional support is necessary. Regarding
H4, the first LM4 indicates that there is a significant interaction
between the EC and QPE in the overall model, indicating that
the effects of QPE on ACT2 are different in both experimental
conditions. In EC1, there was no effect of QPE on ACT2,
whereas in EC2, there was a significant and large effect of
QPE on ACT2.
Discussion
The results support our hypothesis H1, that learning from
advocatory errors in combination with instructional support
fosters argumentation competence, whereas learning from
advocatory errors without instructional support does not foster
argumentation competence, as indicated by the estimated
marginal means. But the results did not indicate which
kind of instructional support is superior due to a lack of
a significant difference between the experimental conditions.
Descriptively, learning from advocatory errors that is supported
by especially targeted elaboration prompts seems superior to
learning that is supported with testing prompts. But the lack
of a significant difference between these two conditions does
not allow a profound conclusion in this way. Thus, an assertion
about the effectiveness of the various prompts is not possible.
A noticeable finding – and a replication of the results from
Study 1 in the experimental condition – is the small amount
of increase in argumentation competence in both experimental
conditions which is firstly shown by the descriptive statistics and
secondly by the estimated marginal means for the difference in
argumentation competence.
TABLE 11 | Regression results for LM4, Study 2.
B SE t p η2
EC1 and EC2
Const. 5.74 2.63 2.18 0.034 –
EC 8.81 3.85 2.28 0.026 0.01
QPE 0.81 0.29 2.80 0.007 0.04
ACT1 0.29 0.09 3.09 0.003 0.13
PKS 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.726 0.01
EC∗QPE −1.10 0.45 −2.45 0.018 0.08
F (5, 52) = 4.12, p = 0.003, R2 = 0.21
EC1
Const. 13.22 4.15 3.19 0.003 –
QPE −0.33 0.39 −0.85 0.410 0.02
ACT1 0.35 0.12 3.03 0.006 0.26
PKS 0.14 0.27 0.54 0.598 0.01
F (3, 25) = 3.38, p = 0.034, R2 = 0.28
EC2
Const. 9.49 3.25 2.93 0.007 –
QPE 0.85 0.26 3.31 0.003 0.29
ACT1 0.01 0.19 0.07 0.943 0.01
PKS 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.731 0.01
F (3, 25) = 4.36, p = 0.013, R2 = 0.34
However, the interpretation of the effectiveness of the prompts
drawing on the testing effect should be taken with care. The
dummy regression coefficient representing the effect of the
testing prompts is very close to the significance level and
the effects size is small. For the evaluation of both prompt
types, H4 matters, too. As there was an interaction effect
of the experimental condition and the quality of prompt
elaboration, the effects of the quality of prompt elaboration
on posttest argumentation competence differ. Whereas for the
testing prompts, there was no effect of the quality of prompt
elaboration, but there was a large effect for the elaboration
prompts. Taken together, a cautious interpretation regarding the
testing prompts is advisable. A cautious interpretation would be
that the elaboration prompts do indeed foster argumentation
competence when learning from advocatory errors, whereas the
testing prompts are only likely to do so.
With regard to H2, the results support the importance of
the present level of argumentation competence, i.e., the level of
argumentation competence in the pretest, on the argumentation
competence in the posttest – and along with this on the learning
outcomes. Again, this indicates a Matthew effect regarding the
present level of argumentation skills. Regarding H3, the results
of Study 2 are different from the results of Study 1, i.e., the prior
knowledge in statistics had effects on argumentation competence
in the pre- and posttest. Moreover, in the posttest, there was
a significant interaction between prior knowledge in statistics
and pretest argumentation competence. This interaction suggests
that in the learning process, a low level of pretest argumentation
competence can be compensated by an adequate level of
statistical knowledge and vice versa. Nevertheless, this finding of
the interaction effect should be replicated and not generalized too
far. However, the results regarding H3 show that it is important
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to consider the present level of argumentation competence and
prior knowledge when evaluating learning interventions.
A shortcoming of this study is that there is no indication
of subjective learning success. On the one hand, measuring
subjective learning success would have allowed gaining insight
into the individual perception of the instructional support.
On the other hand, as all participants received a learning
intervention – the only difference being the kind of instructional
support – it is unclear if considerable differences in subjective
learning success would emerge. Because of the same reason,
subjective learning success would also not be a good indicator of
the internal validity of the study.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of these two studies was first to demonstrate that
learning from advocatory errors in a story-based design fosters
argumentation competence and second, to scrutinize the role
of various kinds of instructional support. With regard to the
first goal, Study 1 indicates the effectiveness of the story-
based approach to learning from advocatory errors. This
result is reflected in Study 2 in which the conditions with
instructional support were effective, too, but not the condition
without instructional support. However, as already mentioned,
the learning gains in both studies were rather small. In
both studies, the participants answered on average two to
three questions more correctly after learning than they did
before. There are several reasons for this, at the first sight,
disappointing results. Firstly, the participants had no opportunity
to practice the newly acquired knowledge. Although the prompts
provided a limited practice opportunity, this may not be
considered as practice. Given the importance of practice in
the classical accounts to learning and instruction (e.g., Gagné,
1985), practicing to recognize errors and to apply avoidance
strategies seems to be necessary. Practice is also important from
the perspective of expertise development (e.g., Ericsson and
Krampe, 1993). Secondly, there is also the issue of transfer,
which is also related to the issue of practice. A narrow
transfer was implemented in the story-based design, each error
and the respective avoidance strategy was explained with two
examples in the both parts of each dialogue. In the context
of the cognitive flexibility theory (e.g., Spiro and Jehng, 1990),
this procedure initiates multiperspectivity that should enable
transfer. However, as argumentation requires some kind of de-
contextualization to support a claim with scientific evidence,
two examples may simply be too few to acquire the necessary
expertise. The kind of argument may also matter. Type 1
arguments, in which a claim is supported by an empirical
finding, may easily be evaluated for issues, e.g., a significant
group difference due to large samples size but small effect
sizes may easily be recognized as an erroneous argument
(e.g., see the error “Misinterpreting significant results”). Type
2 arguments in which the scientific evidence consists in
a substantive evaluation of findings or theories may be
harder to evaluate (e.g., see the errors “False generalizability
of results” and “Neglecting the context”). Considering the
evaluation (or construction) of arguments as a problem-solving
process, Type 1 arguments may require far less practice to
elaborate their deep and surface structure that enable analogical
transfer than Type 2 arguments (cf., Holyoak and Koh, 1987).
Additionally, Britt and Larson (2003) demonstrated that Type
1 arguments are better recalled than Type 2 arguments and
also that Type 1 arguments are read faster. Thus, the position
of the claim and the reason may affect cognitive learning
processes in many ways.
Up to now, we have only considered – more or less – cognitive
factors that may affect the learning process. Another perspective
on the rather low gains in argumentation competence is an
assessment perspective. As indicated by the pretest results, in
both studies the empirical mean of the pretest argumentation
competence is over the theoretical mean of the test and thus, the
participants answered more than half of the questions correctly.
Stated otherwise, the participants already had – in sense of the
used test –a relatively high level of argumentation competence.
Thus, it is likely that the average learning gains are rather low due
to an upcoming ceiling effect.
Another factor, which should be considered when
interpreting the results, is the motivation of the participants.
As already mentioned above in the discussion of the decline
of argumentation competence in the control condition in
Study 1, participants usually take part in a study because of
external requirements and not because they are intrinsically
motivated. Drawing on the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 2000), it is more likely that
students are extrinsically motivated to participate with the
consequence that they only invest minimal effort resulting
in rather low learning outcomes. Along with this is also
the question of interest, which is also a major predictor for
learning (cf., Schiefele et al., 1992; Ainley et al., 2002). It is
plausible that students, especially in the beginning phase of
their university education, are not aware of the importance of
scientific argumentation and have more interest in psychological
knowledge than in acquiring and/or improving scientific
argumentation competence.
Notwithstanding the before discussed cognitive and
motivational factors, the statistical results in combination with
the effect size indicate the presence of gains in argumentation
competence. In summary, the effectiveness of learning from
advocatory errors approach to foster argumentation competence
was demonstrated.
Concerning the second goal, we asked for the effectiveness of
different kinds of instructional support. Because of the present
findings, this goal has to be considered in combination with
the third goal, i.e., the question about the relation between
the quality of prompt elaboration and argumentation and
its relations with the learning outcomes. As stated above,
as an instantiation of example-based learning, learning from
advocatory errors needs instructional support to be effective.
This was demonstrated in Study 2, in which successful learning
occurred in both conditions with instructional support, but
not in the condition without instructional support. The results
provided evidence that both prompt types did not differ in
their effectiveness. However, as already discussed above, because
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of the statistical results, this finding should be cautiously
interpreted. Taken for granted that the two prompt types did
indeed produce the same learning, this result is in line with the
theory behind the testing effect. As the testing prompts were
designed to be cognitively demanding, the results that they are
as effective as the elaboration prompts seem straightforward
(cf., Endres and Renkl, 2015).
But this is in turn in contrast to the findings regarding
the quality of the prompt elaboration and its relation with
the learning outcome, which constituted the third goal of
this study. The present findings suggest that the quality
of the elaboration for the testing prompt did not affect
the posttest argumentation competence, whereas there was
an effect on the quality of the prompt elaboration for the
elaboration prompts. A possibility is that the implementation
of prompts as a multiple-choice task was unfavorable. A study
of Greving and Richter (2018) showed that the testing effect
disappeared when the testing tasks were in multiple-choice
format. Thus, the form in which the testing prompts were
presented may be problematic.
As a general result, we can infer that learning from advocatory
errors is indeed a viable means to foster argumentation
competence. However, instructional support is vital for learning
success. As Study 2 revealed, if no instructional support is
provided, the acquisition of argumentation competence will not
occur. Regarding the type of instructional support, this study
especially indicates the effectiveness of the elaboration prompts.
The effectiveness of the prompts designed after the testing effect
should be further investigated.
LIMITATIONS
Both studies have some limitations. The first limitation
refers to the kind of arguments that we considered in this
contribution. We only used simple arguments consisting
of a claim and a reason. However, typical arguments in
scientific argumentation contain additional elements like
warrants and qualifiers (cf., Toulmin, 1958). Thus, the results
from the reported studies do not necessarily generalize to
more complex arguments. A second issue regarding the
generalization of the results refers to the measurement of
argumentation competence. As argumentation competence
was measured by means of a multiple-choice-test, the
generalizability to a “real-world” argumentation setting
may be questionable. The distractors in the multiple-
choice task were designed to capture the argumentation
errors in the intervention. Thus, the used argumentation
competence measures are tailored to the means of the studies
and the covered argumentation errors. But these errors
are certainly not an extensive collection of all possible
argumentation errors and therefore, the transfer of the
newly acquired (or improved) argumentation competence
to other errors is uncertain. Besides, the multiple-choice tasks
required the evaluation of ready-made reasons or claims,
respectively. Thus, the results do not allow a prediction if the
argumentation errors are avoided when students are constructing
their arguments.
A second and methodical limitation concerns the role
of prior knowledge. Notwithstanding the importance of
prior knowledge for learning and the consequential need
to statistically control the effects of prior knowledge in
the evaluation of interventions, the measurement of prior
knowledge itself may have distorting consequences. As
the discussion about the testing effect makes clear, testing
may activate existing knowledge. Thus, activating the prior
knowledge may have effects on the learning outcomes which
would not appear if there was no testing in advance. From a
methodological point of view, there is a dilemma to control
for the effects but the measurement necessary for controlling
itself may have consequences. A way out of this dilemma
would be to compare conditions with and without prior
knowledge assessment.
A last and rather minor limitation refers to the use of
fictive examples in the dialogue. Although the content for the
exemplifying domain was constructed to avoid possible effects
of domain-specific prior knowledge, the construction of the
examples rested on the properties of psychological knowledge in
general. Thus, participants with a larger psychological knowledge
base might have advantages compared to participants with a
smaller psychological knowledge base.
These limitations should be seen as a set of desiderata for
future research. Future research could take into account more
complex types of arguments and could investigate the role of
prior knowledge assessment on the learning outcome by means
of an adequate experimental setting.
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